Many studies have documented the negative effect of corruption on development, economic growth, and democracy. Independent anti-corruption agencies are often recommended as the tool to curb corruption. However, their efficiency depends on the political will to allocate authority, powers, and resources. Moreover, setting up new institutions is always costly and accordingly problematic to low and middle income countries. The present
INTRODUCTION
The negative effect of corruption on development, economic growth, and democracy is indisputable. 1 Based on success cases, such as Hong Kong and Singapore, anti-corruption agencies constitute a 'best practice' model for fighting corruption. 2 However, Alina Mungio-Pippidi 3 finds little evidence that anti-corruption agencies have any effect. Furthermore, anti-corruption agencies are costly, and 'lack of political will' often jeopardizes anti-corruption policies. 4 Thus, the challenge of how to fight corruption remains. This article asks if and how administrative processes in their own right create incentives that work against temptations to act corruptly. We argue and show that administrative structures and processes in and of themselves have an impact on public employees own judgements when it comes to corruption.
Reforming administrative processes may accordingly be a cost efficient anticorruption tool.
There is a long tradition of searching for causes of corruption in public administration settings. 5 Acknowledging the intrinsic values of earlier studies, we complement their findings in three ways. First, following Pollitt and Bouckaret, we distinguish explicitly between different public administration processes as internal hierarchy, recruitment, monitoring, and relations to external actors. 6 Second, we measure administrative processes through the employees' own experience. We thereby avoid the fallacy of taking formal rules for practice. Third, we depict the commonality of corruption through the employees' perceptions about corruption that is misuse, within their own organization. Although far from being a perfect measure of actual corruption, it is less sensitive to media scandals. Using perceptions on both 4 Frank Anechiarico and James B. Jacobs, How corruption control makes government ineffective (Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 1996); Agnes Batory. "Post-accession malaise? EU conditionality, domestic politics and anti-corruption policy in Hungary," Global Crime 11 (2010). 5 Doron Navot, Yaniv Reingewertz, and Nissim Cohen, "Speed or greed? High wages and corruption among public servants," Administration and Society 48 (2016) ; Carl Dahlström, Victor Lapuente, and Jan Teorell, "The merit of meritocratization: Politics, bureaucracy, and the institutional deterrents of corruption," Political Research Quarterly 65 (2012) ; James E. Rauch and Peter B. Evans, "Bureaucratic structure and bureaucratic performance in less developed countries," Journal of Public Economics 75 (2000) ; Ellen V. Rubin and Andrew Whitford, "Effects of the institutional design of the civil service: Evidence from corruption," International Public management Journal 11 (2008 ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 11, NUMBER 1 2018
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administrative practices and corruption within the specific organization allows us to get closer to the actual mechanism between practices and corruption.
Corruption research often uses aggregate data to compare countries. This has been challenged by increasing knowledge about local level differences and criticized methodologically for neglecting within-country variation. 7 For this study, we developed a survey and got responses from 1706 public employees at both national and sub-national level from Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. 8 The choice of three small, post-communist countries emphasizes a context where public employers have been exposed to extensive administrative reform for more than 20 years and in which corruption -according to the international corruption rating -is high. 9 We approach the relation between public administration processes and corruption in four steps. The first step outlines the theoretical expectations. The second step accounts for the method used and the survey design. The third step describes the dependent variable -the perceived commonality of corruption in the public employees' own organization -and the independent variables -the administrative processes as experienced by the public employees. The fourth step applies OLS regression linking administrative processes with the level of corruption.
Concluding, we discuss if and how public administration can be a cost-efficient anticorruption tool.
THEORY: ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESSES AND CORRUPTION -

RELATED, BUT HOW?
Corruption -the misuse of public position for private gain -was earlier seen as a matter of individual immorality. However, in the 1970s, the research question changed into why and when ordinary men became corrupt in response to extraordinary temptations. 10 Reflecting this, Robert Klitgaard argues that corruption is a function of the individual cost-benefit analysis of the opportunity to engage in corrupt deals, the related economic benefit and the risk of being caught, the formal 14 we focus on eleven items of administrative processes, asking if there is a correspondence between the process practiced in the organization and the perceived commonality of corruption within the same organization. Acknowledging that the items are not exhaustive of all administrative processes, we contend that they make a fair selection with respect to processes that may affect the individual temptation to engage in corrupt deals. For analytical clarity, we discuss the expected relation between administrative processes and temptations to engage in corruption in three parts; i: recruitment, ii: hierarchy and leadership related issues, and iii: salary-related issues.
First, recruitment patterns following the principle of meritocracy in hiring civil servants touches on professionalism, prescribed courses of training and special examinations as well as a specific sense of duty to the purpose of the office. 15 Thus, the controlling effect of meritocracy runs through the civil servants' professionalism emphasizing values of impartiality, equal treatment, and fairness, increasing the moral costs of being corrupt. 16 In the survey, we look into the professional values by asking if 'bending rules' are found acceptable. Besides professionalism, meritocratic recruitment minimizes corruption because it disconnect the public employee from the political chain of command, thereby protecting him/her from undue political the superior (the principal) and the subordinated employee (the agent) empowers the latter vis-à-vis the former, creating loopholes for unsupervised acts. 21 The information gap between the principal and an agent does not necessarily imply that the agent is corrupt, but it gives the agent the opportunity and, thus, the temptation to use the information asymmetry to his advantage.
Hierarchy also adds layers to the organization. Susan Rose-Ackerman contends that "high-level bureaucrats in a tightly supervised hierarchy may have just as many unsupervised contracts with applicants as low-level employees have in organizations that allow considerable discretion to those at the bottom". 22 Thus, instead of working as control hierarchy may move corruption upwards in the organization. 23 Corruption among top-level public employees raises an ethical problem among lower level employees whether to come forward with knowledge of corrupt acts or to keep silent. 24 Moreover, if the higher levels in hierarchical organizations are infected by corrupt behavior, would-be non-corrupt employees at the lower levels tend to bend in. 25 The mechanism is reflected in a Schilling diagram illustrating that, when bribery becomes widespread in the organization, it becomes rational for an individual to ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 11, NUMBER 1 2018
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partake because s/he believes everybody else is doing so. 26 Hierarchy combined with corrupt top-level bureaucrats is thereby a factor feeding into systemic corruption where corrupt behavior becomes the organizational norm. 27 In sum, the effect of hierarchy can either be a control on lower level employees or part of the evil itself.
Co-ordination implies involvement of external actors and -just as hierarchyit works as a controlling devise because it increases oversight, thus counteracting bureaucratic isolated and corrupt silos. 28 However, in line with the New Public
Governance approach co-ordination may also mean inclusion of citizens and enhanced public-private co-operation. 29 Johan G. Lambsdorff argues that interpersonal trust between the private actor and the public employee increases the risk of corrupt behavior. 30 Thus, even if citizen participation is normatively valued, inclusion of citizens and private actors opens a Pandora's Box of particularism through increased interpersonal trust. 31 In sum, co-ordination may have a controlling effect through checks-and-balances, but including private actors could also have a corruption facilitating effect. In the study, we seek to balance this question by asking about practices of co-ordination and about the importance of private networks in decision-making.
Monitoring the staff and setting clear objectives for organizational tasks may also work as a control mechanism as it minimizes discretion through transparent yardsticks and implies tighter oversight. Goal setting is an efficient management tool that makes employees more motivated to follow organizational objectives than individual self-interest. 32 Research also shows that ethical leadership is likely to increase an employee's willingness to report on unethical behaviour reflecting their confidence that superiors will take appropriate and corrective action. 33 Thus, if Third, salaries seem crucial when analysing the temptation of corruption.
Already Max Weber noticed that paying civil servants decent wages and securing them an economically safe old-age retirement were part of creating a professional civil service. 34 Thus, salaries work as a control because sufficiently high salaries increase individual losses if caught in corruption. Several scholars have argued that meagre paychecks matter, when it comes to the individual temptation. 35 The temptation, however, does not necessarily depend on the absolute wage. According to Caroline von Rijkeghem and Beatrice Weder it is the relative wage (the difference between public and private salaries) that induces corruption, but using Rijkeghem and Weder's dataset, Shang-Jin Wei found little effect. 36 Moreover, Navot, Reingewertz, and Cohen argue that high wages for public employees are, at best, a questionable measure against corruption. 37 However, if we expect the level of salaries to decrease temptations to engage in corrupt act, relating salary to performance -performance salary or payment-for-performance (PfP) schemesgives the superior an additional and more direct way to influence subordinates behaviour. In this way, PfP may even enhance systemic corruption if corruption is common at the organizations' top-level.
The link between administrative processes and corruption is complex. The following expectations seem justifiable. We expect merit to minimize corruption through professionally enhanced intrinsic values of impartiality and legality.
Hierarchical organizations may affect bribe-taking in different ways depending on the organizational culture. Co-ordination works as a control mechanism through checksand-balances, but inclusion of private actors and making decisions through personal 34 Max Weber, supra note 15, 959. 35 38 Incentives for corruption may be higher in sub-national administrations because task specifications typically give them more hands-on service delivery, production, and direct contact with citizens. In contrast, national level bureaucrats have other tasks exposing them, however, to other forms of corruption. Furthermore, it is argued that national level bureaucrats interacting with international organizations in our cases in particular the EU become socialized toward
European non-corrupt values. 39 We now turn to the research design and method.
METHOD
This study uses a survey within a comparative design. We first discuss the country selection, then the survey, and lastly we map the variables.
THE COMPARATIVE STUDY
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania constitute an almost ideal similar systems design, which reduces the possible effect of shared background variables such as late statehood, degree of inclusion in the Soviet economic, political, and administrative system, as well as post-transitional choices of political institutions. 40 These similarities control for standard political variables associated with perceived corruption. 41 Similarities in the background variables are connected with differences in the dependent variable. Estonia has outperformed Latvia and Lithuania throughout the years, consistently demonstrating lower levels of perceived corruption by international ranking. 42 Estonian uniqueness has been traced back to specific 38 Susan Rose-Ackerman, supra note 22. 39 Irrespective of Estonian uniqueness, the possible effect of a Soviet legacy on present-day administrative processes deserves two comments. First, a Soviet legacy has to be carried over by public employees who served under communism, and second, if corruption is due to Soviet legacy we assume the Baltic public employees were effectively socialized to act in an organized and collusive manner. 44 In the first account, extensive changes in public administration personnel after 1990 suggest that the Soviet legacy has limited, if any, effect. 45 In the second account, the underlying assumption is questionable because the Baltic administrative elite was active parts in the liberation from Soviet rule. 46 However, to address the issue we constructed an 'old guard variable' with a cut-off at the age of 45 arguing that if the Soviet legacy has an effect it should be traceable among public employees over 45
because people over that age have personal memories of this period even if they did not serve in Soviet administrations.
On a final note, different national political interests influenced administrative reforms and implementation of administrative reforms differed in tempi across and within the countries. 47 Thus even though the three Baltic countries share many features, there are differences that compel us to report several models carefully scrutinizing within-and between-country effects. 
THE SURVEY
The survey was carried out in April 2011. It used a questionnaire developed by the authors as part of a project examining administrative capacity and corruption.
The questionnaire captures eleven items of public administration characteristics and issues related to corruption. The questions on public administration processes are based on public administration literature, recommendations for public administration reforms by EU and others, and discussions with public administration specialists. To check the reliability of the questions, 100 interviews served as a pilot. We found that the questions seemed to work and made no changes. It is a limitation of this study that the variables measuring specific public administration processes are based on single items. The estimation would certainly improve if we had used a battery of questions establishing the processes as dimensions. This is, however, what the survey offers and, given that better data is not available, we find that the study contributes to a debate, which is relevant for public administration reform in general, and with respect to transition countries in particular.
To ensure a representative sample of Baltic public employees, a minimum of 500 respondents were stipulated, and overall, 1706 public employees completed (or nearly completed) the questionnaires (see Table 1 ). Respondents were randomly selected among employees who, according to national codes, possess decision authority, per instruction or discretion, typically carrying the title Head of Section or higher to distinguish them from rank-and-file public employees. In addition, it was required that three quarters of the respondents be employed at the sub-national level in order to reflect the fact that an increasing number of public employees are employed at this level and to account for agency-level differences.
ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 11, NUMBER 1 2018 Relying on individual self-experiences and perceptions, the study bears with it the problems of perception studies. However, based on Yang and Callahan, 48 we contend that perceptions are valid indicators for organizational properties. Moreover, even if the core public administration legislation was in place in the early 1990s, the implementation of the legal framework was incomplete creating a discrepancy between law in books and law in practice. 49 processes through the lenses of public employees' own perceptions and experiences seems a better approach than relying on written sources, which may and may not capture the real world.
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Acknowledging that the three countries are similar but not identical, we employ OLS regression analysis with country controls (Estonia as reference). The regression controls for level of administration to capture within country difference and for individual characteristics such as age (old guard variable) and gender.
MAPPING THE VARIABLES
The dependent variable -the extent of misuse -is estimated as public employees' perception of the commonality of misuse within their own organization.
Although over one third 'totally disagree' that 'misuse of public position takes place in [their] organization', a majority of 63 percent cannot exclude that misuse takes place in their own organization although very few find it more common than not. As noted above, the use of perception data can be problematic. This is especially so when asking sensitive questions about topics such as corruption. First, we remove 
Note: 1 reflects 'never present' and 7 'always present'.
The country-wide overview shows a picture of public administration processes characterized by meritocracy and hierarchical organizations, while the picture is less clear on the other items. The overall impression is one of similarity as the shapes of the lines throughout the web follow each other closely. However, it also shows that the Lithuanian and Latvian lines follow each other more closely compared to the Estonian, which gives credit to the previous argument about Estonian uniqueness. 50 Stephen Knack, "Measuring corruption: A critique of indicators in Eastern Europe and Central Asia,"
Journal of Public Policy 27 (2007).
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ANALYSIS: PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION PROCESSES AND THE TEMPTATION TO BE CORRUPT
Do administrative processes curb corruption? In order to answer the question we regress the 11 items against respondents' perception of corruption within their own organization. Table 3 reports the regression analysis in four models: Model 1
shows the full sample, and models 2, 3, and 4 report regressions for each country.
ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 11, NUMBER 1 2018 The full sample (model 1) provides four lessons with respect to the administrative processes identified in the theoretical part. First, we confirm others'
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findings that meritocracy is a corruption-controlling devise. Changing recruitment procedures from a situation in which merit never comes into question to a situation in which merit is always the case misuse in the organization will decrease by fully Third, if public employees believe using private networks in decision-making and accepting bending of rules is widespread in their organization they also tend to believe the organization to be more corrupt. Decisions made in the shadows through networks escape transparency and rule bending are intuitively associated with risk of 51 Fourth, besides differences in administrative processes, the study shows that administrative structures matter. Public employees at sub-national level find corruption to be more common within their organization. The general significance may, however, be driven by Estonia (model 2). Re-running the statistics on subnational employees we find that an increase in meritocracy leads to a statistically significant decrease in misuse (B = -0.208) (not shown). This suggests that to overcome structural differences -the sub-national level pending towards more corruption -increasing meritocracy would be a "low-hanging fruit" to catch that could perhaps counteract the negative effect of decentralisation.
A few words about the insignificant findings. First, the effect of external coordination is statistically insignificant. Thus, a more detailed battery of questions is needed to study this question. Second, the study cannot confirm that salary matters -neither relative to private sector nor connected to performance. The inconsistent effect of salaries echoes other studies as mentioned in the theoretical part as well as a study addressing perception of corruption in Estonia. 56 More surprising performance payment schemes (PfP) also turn out to be insignificant. This may, however, be attributed to transition factors. In East Europe, PfP is not widespread (se also figure 1 ) and it does not work as expected as managers tend to allocate additional payment arbitrarily and based on personal relations. 57 In that context, it is positive that PfP does not contribute significantly to employees' perception of corruption. compared to men are less likely to condone corruption. 58 The lack of a gender effect may reflect that within public administration socialization received through workplace and education does not shape cognition and attitudes toward corruption in a genderspecific way. 59 However, gender may still be important due to job segregation within public-sector job categories, 60 which is something this study does not capture.
CONCLUSION
This study bears with it some limitations. Precautions due to difficulties operating a survey in a multi-country setting and the linguistic challenges will always need attention. Use of perceptions as valid indicators for organizational properties is also an issue. 61 That said, the study breaks ground on how a closer look at administrative processes may be a cost efficient corruption control instrument.
Most studies of corruption take the form of cross-country examinations based on formal data and/or expert opinions. Corruption being essentially about individual incentives, corruption research faces a problem with the level of analysis, for example, attempts to infer from macro-to micro-level. Bringing in micro-data in corruption studies is a recent development. 62 Our study contributes to this development.
Three findings stand out. First, the study supports earlier studies findings that meritocracy is a cornerstone for building impartial quality administration. 63 Second, management plays a clear role. It is not only a question of overseeing, control and monitoring, but also of maintaining and developing a motivated workforce as argued in public service motivation studies and suggested with respect to ethical behaviour. 64 This finding is crucial, because it underlines the importance of incorrupt top-level leaders and the caution related to hierarchical organizational structures. The third finding pays attention to the lack of effect of the pay check, suggesting that when it ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 11, NUMBER 1 2018
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comes to combating corruption, focusing on morality and values is the more lasting way than trying to 'pay' people to act according to rules.
For the last 20 years, international organizations have recommended independent anti-corruption agencies as the tool to curb corruption. However, their efficiency depends on political will to allocate authority, powers, and resources.
Moreover, setting up new institutions is always a costly case. The present study suggests that a closer look at public administration processes is a tool to combat corruption. While we confirm others that strengthening meritocracy and monitoring works against corruption, we add attention to the reverse effect associated with hierarchical organizations, norms accepting rule bending, and network decisions.
These reverse effects suggest that although reforming administrative processes can contribute to a cleaner administrative environment, policies creating independent anti-corruption agencies are not redundant.
APPENDIX
Survey questions using a Likert scale from 1 (never) to 7 (always).
Dependent variable: Do you agree or disagree that misuse of public positions takes place in your organization?
Independent variables:
1.
Recruitment of employees is based on the skills and merits of the applicant.
2.
Your organization is hierarchically structured.
3.
A: Given the risk of not treating all citizens equally, are you in favor of bending the rules in order to achieve policy objectives? B: Do you accept bending the rules in order to achieve policy objectives? Originally formed as a split but pooled as statistics showed no effect of the stimulus.
4.
Salaries are comparable with salaries of private positions with roughly similar training and responsibilities.
5.
Salaries are linked to the individual's contribution to achieving the organization's policy objectives.
6.
Decisions are made on the basis of personal networks.
7.
When thinking about the relation between your organization and other actors, how often do you think that tasks relating to our organization and other actors are highly coordinated?
8.
When thinking about the relation between your organization and other actors, how often do you think that private parties (individuals, firms, NGOs) are involved in the implementation of the organization's policy objectives?
9.
The work is effectively monitored by the management.
